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Scholars have increasingly investigated “crowdsourcing” as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely
data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowd-
sourcing can outperform these other approaches. However, despite interest in the topic and a series of suc-
cessful use cases, relatively few studies have applied empirical model thinking to evaluate the accuracy and
robustness of crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. In this paper, we offer three novel contributions. First,
we explore a dataset of over 600,000 predictions from over 7,000 participants in a multi-year tournament to
predict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, we develop a comprehensive crowd
construction framework that allows for the formal description and application of crowdsourcing to real-world
data. Third, we apply this framework to our data to construct more than 275,000 crowd models. We find
that in out-of-sample historical simulations, crowdsourcing robustly outperforms the commonly-accepted null
model, yielding the highest-known performance for this context at 80.8% case level accuracy. To our knowl-
edge, this dataset and analysis represent one of the largest explorations of recurring human prediction to date,
and our results provide additional empirical support for the use of crowdsourcing as a prediction method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The future appears to be intrinsically uncertain de-
spite our best attempts to divine the mechanisms of a
clockwork universe. Yet even though we are not able
to fully understand the precise mechanics underlying
many phenomena, we are still able to predict the future
in many circumstances. We can assess future medical
risk,1,2 forecast the weather,3 trade securities,4 predict
future sales,5,6 and identify future geopolitical events.7,8
Indeed, individuals and organizations, both large and
small, spend a substantial amount of effort and energy
generating various types of forecasts. In some cases, pre-
dictions appear as if they perfectly anticipate the future,
but in many other cases, the predictions of even our
best experts and models appear to be no better than
random.9,10,11
While predictions vary in many ways, they all share
one characteristic - they are the product of at least one
of three sources: (i) a single human, typically an expert,
(ii) a group of humans, commonly referred to as a crowd,
or (iii) a model - statistical, rule-based, or otherwise - i.e.,
an algorithm. It is also possible to construct a “model
of models” or ensemble of all three approaches; in fact,
crowds are themselves a “model of models” built on pre-
dictions of individuals.12,13 Throughout human history,
and long before the creation of the scientific method, hu-
mans have been using all three of these approaches, in-
cluding such model-based predictions as augury and as-
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trology. However, in recent years, attention has increas-
ingly focused on “scientific” approaches to prediction.
In this paper, we investigate the prediction of future
events using crowds and models thereof. This prac-
tice, commonly referred to as “crowdsourcing,” has re-
ceived increasing interest over the past years across a
wide variety of problems.14,15,16,17 Despite interest in the
topic and a series of successful use cases, relatively few
studies have rigorously applied empirical model think-
ing to evaluate both the accuracy and robustness of
crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. This paper con-
tributes to the extant literature on prediction by present-
ing results from an online prediction tournament called
“FantasySCOTUS.”18 Over the past several years, par-
ticipants with diverse backgrounds and experience levels
have competed to predict the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOTUS). Collectively, more
than 7,000 participants have cast over 600,000 predic-
tions across nearly 450 cases between 2011 and 2017.
Using this data, we are able to empirically evaluate the
performance of a model space of more than 275,000 dif-
ferent crowdsourcing models.
We begin in Section II by describing the FantasySCO-
TUS dataset, including the history of the tournament
and basic facts about the dataset. Next, in Section III,
we describe in detail our research goals and motivating
principles, and how this research sits in the context of
prior work on crowdsourcing, prediction and legal pre-
diction. Once these goals and principles are outlined, we
proceed in Section IV to formalize a crowd construction
framework that can be applied generally to any crowd-
sourcing problem. We apply this framework in Section V
to evaluate the performance of over 275,000 crowd mod-
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2els across a range of crowd construction parameters. We
find that crowdsourcing yields both accurate and robust
results, including a peak performance of over 80% ac-
curacy, which is the highest documented performance for
Supreme Court prediction. We conclude in Section VI by
summarizing our findings and discussing future research
on the topic.
II. DATA
A. FantasySCOTUS Background
FantasySCOTUS is an online prediction tournament in
which participants cast predictions about “SCOTUS” -
the Supreme Court of the United States. In the fashion of
a fantasy sports league, correct predictions for the votes
of each Justice of the Supreme Court are rewarded with
points, and these points are tallied through the Term of
the Supreme Court, beginning each October and end-
ing in the following summer.18 Participation in Fanta-
sySCOTUS is open to individuals without any “buy-in”
or qualification, although prizes are restricted to US cit-
izens. Whether an individual is young or old, expert or
novice, they can register for free and predict. Thus, while
the set of participants certainly exhibits some selection
biases, the crowd as a whole contains a wide range of par-
ticipants with varied backgrounds competing for prizes.
Throughout the last eight terms - October 2009
through October 2016 - the contest rules and prize struc-
ture have varied, with first place prize ranging from a
non-cash “golden gavel” trophy to a $10,000 cash prize.
Yet while rules and incentives for contest participants
have varied, the rules of the Court have not. Each year,
petitioners ask the Supreme Court to hear their case
against an opposing party, called the respondent. If four
or more of the Court’s Justices agree to hear the case,
then the Court generally accepts the case onto its docket
by granting a petition for a writ of certiorari. Once cer-
tiorari is granted, FantasySCOTUS generally lists these
new cases on its site within days. In the event that Jus-
tices announce their recusal from a case, they are marked
as ineligible on the case; for all other Justices, Fanta-
sySCOTUS participants may begin predicting vote out-
comes as soon as the cases are available on the site.
The petitioners and respondents then submit written
materials supporting their positions, and hold one or
more in-person arguments before the Court. Following
oral argument, the Court may issue an opinion on any
Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday around 10AM Eastern
as designated on its calendar. External observers do not
know in advance which cases will be decided on which
days, but in practice, even the simplest opinions may take
the Court at least one month to decide, draft, and pub-
lish. Participants therefore know that, once the Court
has completed its request for materials and argument,
they must cast their predictions prior to such designated
announcement dates.
Ultimately, the votes of each participating Justice are
made public in the published opinions of cases. In gen-
eral, they vote to either affirm or reverse the status quo
represented by the lower court’s prior decision. While
these rules do not apply in some cases, such as decisions
of a split court or per curiam decisions, all but a small
percent of Supreme Court votes can be represented as
simple binary outcomes. Over the last decade, the Court
has ruled on approximately 60-90 cases per term, result-
ing in approximately 500-800 binary Justice votes per
term.
B. FantasySCOTUS Data
As with many sites, FantasySCOTUS has evolved since
it was first launched in 2009,18 migrating from its orig-
inal blog format to its current purpose-built web appli-
cation. Beginning with the 2011 term, the underlying
data model and contest rules have been relatively consis-
tent, and we therefore begin the analysis from this term.
While data from prior terms is available, the 2009 and
2010 formats, which were focused on whether a Justice
signed to the majority opinion, unfortunately preclude
comparison with later terms.
Given this constraint, our period of analysis thus be-
gins with the 2011 term and ends with the completion of
the 2016 term, resulting in a total of six terms available
for analysis. For each case listed on FantasySCOTUS
during these years, we also compare our cases against
those listed in the Supreme Court Database (SCDB).19
In some situations, cases were listed on FantasySCOTUS
but never officially decided by the Supreme Court and
therefore unpublished in SCDB. For example, cases such
as UBS v. Unio´n de Empleados and Cline v. Oklahoma
Coalition for Reproductive Justice received thousands of
FantasySCOTUS predictions, but were subsequently set-
tled by the parties or dismissed by the Court prior to for-
mal decision. In these cases, we omit such records from
this analysis, as no measurable contest outcome occurred
and these cases cannot be merged with SCDB data.
Once these records are handled and SCDB data is
merged, the resulting dataset contains 7,284 unique par-
ticipants, 425 listed cases, 182 dates of decision, and
636,859 predicted votes for 10 separate Justices, in-
cluding Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. In some
situations, these cases may be re-argued in successive
terms, resulting in some cases counting twice in Table I.
These predictions begin with Greene v. Fisher, decided
in November of 2011, and end with Davila v. Davis, de-
cided in June 2017.
This dataset is from the real world, for better and
worse, and there are many noteworthy caveats. First,
636,859 predictions is many fewer than the theoretical
upper bound - the number of participants times the num-
ber of cases and Justices, which would total approxi-
mately 30 million; in fact, it is less than 3% of the to-
3tal number of predictions possible under maximal con-
ditions. This sparsity is partially the result of Justice
recusals or absences, such as the vacant seat left after
Justice Scalia unexpectedly passed away in 2016. More
accurately, however, this sparsity is the first hint that
our crowd changes over time. Like many other real-world
crowds, participants join and exit, either temporarily or
permanently, resulting in high turnover and low stability
period-over-period. Within our window of analysis, only
six participants participated in every term, and 108 par-
ticipants participated in at least three terms. The mean
and median number of terms participated in are 1.09 and
1.00, respectively, demonstrating the high level of attri-
tion bias. As demonstrated below, this changing crowd
composition presents challenges for our analysis relative
to theoretical models.
Second, while most participants do not predict most
cases, some update their predictions in a single case mul-
tiple times. The average number of predictions per par-
ticipant per outcome is approximately 1.1, and some cast
many more predictions; in fact, some of our highest-
scoring participants act like “foxes,” frequently updat-
ing their predictions for some cases.9 While patterns of
behavior like “foxes” and “hedgehogs” are worthy of ad-
ditional research, for the purposes of this paper, we ex-
clude from our analysis all “non-final” predictions. The
resulting set of “final” predictions - the last recorded pre-
diction for each participant for each Justice in each case
that was cast before midnight on the date of decision of
the case - consists of 545,845 remaining predictions.
Third, while the number of active participants per term
has fallen, the average engagement level - as measured
by the average number of predicted cases per partici-
pant per term - has increased. These variations are most
likely due to changes in prize structure and marketing.
In the 2013, 2014, and 2015 terms, higher prizes and
more marketing assistance for the FantasySCOTUS con-
test attracted more new participants. Though this re-
sulted in large numbers of new participants, these par-
ticipants also dropped out faster than average, predicting
fewer cases per term before leaving. Thus, while the pop-
ulation of participants is lower in 2015 and 2016 than in
2013 and 2014, the remaining population’s engagement
rate is higher. This trend and other per-term summary
statistics are shown in Table I below.
Term Predictions Participants Cases Engagement
2011 81,320 1,336 82 6.9
2012 76,786 1,348 81 6.4
2013 115,326 1,951 77 6.7
2014 127,138 1,824 73 7.8
2015 87,084 927 71 11.5
2016 58,191 621 65 11.7
TABLE I. Summary statistics for FantasySCOTUS Partici-
pation data by term.
In order to promote reproducible research and further
study, participant-anonymized FantasySCOTUS data
will be released to GitHub and the FantasySCOTUS
website.20 In addition, the source code used to produce
the simulations and figures in this publication will be re-
leased there. We encourage other researchers to build on
our efforts in future research.
III. RESEARCH PRINCIPLES AND PRIOR WORK
In this section, we set out our research goals, including
key questions and principles, and discuss prior work in
this area.
A. Research Principles
In this paper, we investigate whether and under what
conditions crowdsourcing can provide accurate predic-
tions for Supreme Court decisions relative to other avail-
able methods. Our approach to answering these ques-
tions is guided by three principles. First, we must work
with real data, even when it deviates far from theory. Un-
like much of the theoretical work in the field,21,22 most
actual crowds do not have a fixed, odd number N of
participants with known probability distributions. Fan-
tasySCOTUS participants, by contrast, join and exit the
crowd day by day and case by case. Participants act,
as humans generally do, in ways that we cannot control.
They possess a range of changing and heterogeneous indi-
vidual attributes, including differing cognitive processes,
information sets, and effort levels. In order to translate
theory to practice, models must support a number of
dynamics, including the addition of new predictors with
unknown behaviors, the non-stationarity of predictor be-
havior, and both the temporary and permanent removal
of predictors. The literature has confronted some of these
challenges but many remain unresolved.23,24,25,26,27,28
Second, in order for our results to accurately reflect
what historical performance would have been, we must
ensure that models produce only out-of-sample predic-
tions - that is, models must not incorporate any in-
sample or “future” information that would not have been
knowable as of the simulated date. For example, we can-
not use information about a participant’s accuracy or
rank in February of 2015 to predict a case from January
of 2015.
Third, while we evaluate the performance of a few il-
lustrative model configurations, we are not merely inter-
ested in the performance of a single crowd per se, but of
crowdsourcing generally. In other words, we evaluate our
primary claims for an entire space of models, not just for
a single model. To do so, we must develop a framework
for model construction, select a parameter space, gen-
erate many simulated historical crowds to analyze, and
report the aggregate results.
We can summarize these three modeling principles as
follows:
41. Empirical: Our analysis should use empirical
data and directly confront properties that are of-
ten present in real-world crowds.
2. Out-of-sample: Our analysis should reflect the
historically-accurate information set available to
predictors, allowing us to faithfully reproduce how
a given model would have actually performed.
3. Model space, not merely a single model: Our
analysis and its findings should be based on the
aggregate results of an entire space of models.
B. Prior Work
There is substantial prior work both on the science
of crowdsourcing and on legal prediction, and it is im-
portant to understand how this paper contributes and
compares to both of these extant literatures.
Given the importance of forecasting to many individu-
als and institutions, there is increasing interest in the sci-
ence of prediction.29,30,31 Indeed, the field of predictive
analytics is a fast-growing area of both industrial interest
and academic study. Although much of the forecasting
literature has been published in fields such as statistics,
computer science, and artificial intelligence, social science
has recently begun to focus on this area as well.32,33,34
In an effort to bring greater rigor to the challenge of
forecasting economic, political, or social outcomes, and
notwithstanding the fact that causal inference is clearly
the dominant methodological orientation in the social
sciences,31,35,36 there have been a range of important
contributions published over the past few years with im-
plications for a variety of academic fields.37,38,39,40,41,42
Of greatest relevance to the current inquiry is the grow-
ing number of papers focused on predicting the actions of
legal institutions and actors.43,44,45,46 Given the overall
significance of legal decisions not only to individual par-
ticipants but also to capital markets47 and society as a
whole,48,49 the development of rigorous quantitative le-
gal predictions50 can have wide-spread benefits. In exist-
ing literature, scholars have typically applied well-known
algorithms or variants thereof to forecast the decision-
making processes of legal actors and institutions.43,46 In
addition, the literature has examined the performance
of certain subject matter experts and compared their
performance to statistical models.46,51 Algorithmic ap-
proaches have in some cases matched or exceeded the
accuracy of subject matter experts.
As highlighted in Section I, crowdsourcing can provide
an alternative approach to expert judgment and algorith-
mic decision-making. There has been significant work to
date on both theoretical21,22,26 and empirical analysis
of crowdsourcing.14,15,16,17 Unfortunately, much of the
existing work falls short relative to one or more of our
research principles. In particular, much of the literature
either lacks real data or relies on the analysis of a sin-
gle model selected post hoc. To our knowledge, no other
study presents an analysis of crowdsourcing that evalu-
ates the historical out-of-sample performance of a real
model space of crowds.
Further, across the literature, there is substantial con-
ceptual confusion regarding what constitutes crowdsourc-
ing and how crowds are constructed.52 At their core,
crowds are just the aggregation of individual predictive
signals, each of which may or may not provide predictive
insight. The study of crowdsourcing is an exploration
of how and when “collective knowledge can be pooled
together to address problems more efficiently and accu-
rately than decisions from individuals.”18 While there is
often a strong desire to seek wisdom from crowds, in re-
ality, crowdsourcing is as much a process of segmenta-
tion as aggregation. Many crowdsourcing methods seek
to boost predictive performance by identifying and over-
weighting the best-performing players. In general, how-
ever, crowd models vary widely in their construction, and
crowdsourcing does not refer to a specific technique or al-
gorithm. In Section IV below, we seek to address this gap
in the literature by developing a formal crowd construc-
tion framework.
IV. CROWD CONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK
As discussed in Section III A above, we want to evalu-
ate not only the performance a of specific crowdsourcing
model but also the overall space of crowd models. To do
so, we first define a crowd construction framework which
features varying potential hyperparameters and configu-
rations.
A. Model Notation
Let d be an index for Supreme Court case or “docket”
and let T (d) be the date of decision for docket d. Let
N(d) be the number of participants with at least one
prediction for a case d, and the set of such participants
be S(d). Then let the crowd vector for a Justice j in case
d be ~Cj(d, S(d)) =
(
cj1(d), · · · , cjN(d)(d)
)
, where cji (d) is
the prediction of the ith participant for the jth Justice
in the dth case. cji (d) is 1 when participant i predicts
that Justice j will vote to reverse in case d, else 0. Let
the actual observed vote of Justice i in case d be vj(d).
Finally, let the information state I(t) be the set of Cj(d)
and vj(d) for all d s.t. T (d) < t - that is, let the in-
formation state reflect knowable participant predictions
and Justice votes prior to the date of decision.
A crowd model is a function M j(d) that takes as input
the information state I(t) and crowd vector ~Cj(d, S(d))
and yields a score in [0, 1], where 0 implies affirm and 1
implies reverse for Justice j. Some models, but not all,
can be represented as linear transforms of ~Cj(d), as we
shall explore below.
5B. Crowd Subsets
In some cases, such as in Condorcet juries, models may
use predictions from all participants. In other cases, how-
ever, models may only take into account information from
some subset of participants. These subsets can be defined
either positively, through inclusion rules, or negatively,
through exclusion rules. Let a crowd subset S∗(d) ⊆ S(d)
be defined as the set {i : s(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S(d)},
where s(·) encodes for one or more inclusion rules. Com-
mon inclusion rules for defining subsets are listed below:
1. Experience: Let XP(i, I(d)) be the number of
cases that participant i has predicted as of case d.
Then an experience threshold function s(i, I(d)) =
IXP(i,I(d))≥p. In other words, a participant i must
have predicted at least p cases.
2. Performance: Let P (i, I(d)) be a performance
function such as accuracy or F1 score. Then
a performance threshold function s(i, I(d)) =
IP (i,I(d))≥a. In other words, a participant i must
have a Justice or case-level accuracy or F1 score
of at least a%. Performance can be defined using
either broad or specific measures; for example, par-
ticipants might be ranked based on their accuracy
over all time and for all Justices, or they might be
ranked only on their accuracy in the last 20 cases
for a particular Justice.
3. Rank: Let RP (i, I(d)) be the rank of a partici-
pant i under some performance measure P . Then
a rank threshold function s(i, I(d)) = IRP (i,I(d))≤r.
In other words, a participant i must be in the top r
participants as ranked by some performance mea-
sure. The decision theoretic strategy commonly
known as “follow the leader” (FTL) can be seen
as a rank threshold function with r = 1 or r = 0
for ranks beginning with 1 or 0, respectively. Fur-
thermore, setting the rank threshold can be seen
as analogous to choosing a “crowd size” in other
literature.
4. Statistical: Let F (i, I(d)) be the p-value or power
of a statistical test. Then a statistical threshold
function s(i, I(d)) = IF (i,I(d))≤p∗ . In other words,
a participant i must pass some statistical test F ,
such as a binomial or t-test, with some given sig-
nificance or power.
These subset rules can be applied either independently
or in combination. For example, a crowd subset can be
defined by combining experience and rank rules to create
a crowd of the top 10 participants who have predicted
at least 10 cases, or the top 25 participants who pass a
one-sided binomial test with a p-value less than 0.05.
C. Linear Crowd Models
Many crowd models can be represented as linear trans-
forms of a crowd subset, and for such models, weight
vectors are the key to understanding behavior. Most re-
search on crowds has, until recently, relied on this ap-
proach. Below, we outline common approaches for defin-
ing weight vectors.
1. Equal Weight: Equal weight models, as the name
implies, assign an equal weight to the predictions
of all participants in a crowd subset - i.e., for a
crowd subset S∗(d), then an equal weight model
M j(d) would be defined as 1|S∗(d)|
∑
i∈S∗(d) c
j
i (d).
Such models are equivalent to majority-rule voting
frameworks like Condorcet juries, and therefore the
predictions of all participants receive equal weight
in the final model prediction.
2. Linear Weight: Linear weight models can be
used in combination with a performance or expe-
rience function or ranking, such as RP above. A
linear weight model M j(d) would be defined as
1∑
i∈S∗(d) RP (i)
∑
i∈S∗(d)RP (i) · cji (d). In such mod-
els, for example, a participant who has predicted
twice as many cases as another might have his or
her predictions receive twice as much weight.
3. Exponential Weight: Exponential weight mod-
els are often used in combination with a perfor-
mance or experience ranking like RP above. An
exponential weight model M j(d) would be defined
as 1∑
i∈S∗(d) exp(−α·RP (i))
∑
i∈S∗(d) exp(−α · RP (i)) ·
cji (d) for some scale factor α. If the rank function
RP (i) is defined such that no ties are produced,
then the finite series sums above can also be fur-
ther simplified. The parameter α can also be used
to produce widely varying behaviors. For exam-
ple, when α = 0, then we recover the equal weight
model above, but for sufficiently large α, we recover
the “follow-the-leader” model.
D. “Machine Learning” Crowd Models
Not all models can be represented as weight vectors
applied to a crowd subset through dot product. For ex-
ample, a more general class of “machine learning” mod-
els that defy this particular characterization (but might
otherwise be effective) include tree-based models, neu-
ral network models, or logistic or support vector models.
Such models still produce a result in [0, 1] - through clas-
sification, probability scoring, or regression and calibra-
tion - but do so in ways that may involve non-linear or
discontinuous transforms.
More importantly, such models may incorporate addi-
tional information or features more naturally than sim-
ple linear transformations. For example, suppose that we
6would like to augment our information state I with infor-
mation about the identity of the petitioners and respon-
dents or the nature of specific legal questions involved in
a given case. It is unclear how such information could be
incorporated in a principled and statistical manner into
an equal-weight (“majority-rule”) voting model. While
such models explain how to weight the predictions of par-
ticipants, they do not provide any guidance on what to
do with non-participant information. If, instead, a model
such as a random forest or support vector machine is be-
ing used, then we can simply encode this non-participant
information as additional features for the model to con-
sider. As with any machine learning model, we allow the
model to determine the relative feature weights or coef-
ficients based on loss or error rates in the training sam-
ple. While there is reason to believe that such machine
learning models can provide additional benefits over lin-
ear models, in this paper, we focus on crowdsourcing
generally and therefore exclude models that include non-
participant information.
V. MODEL TESTING AND RESULTS
Imagine if the following story were real. In Octo-
ber 2011, a million-dollar prize was announced to pre-
dict six years of decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States using crowdsourcing data. Thousands of
teams from across industry and academia respond to
the challenge, each making slightly different but reason-
able choices about how to cast their predictions. Some
teams develop models that rely more on “following the
leader(s),” while other teams listen for the “wisdom of
the crowd” at large. Some teams develop complicated
weighting schemes, while others stick with simple equal
weighting. Some teams even update their models over
the six year challenge, iterating from their first attempt
to explore more and more of the model space. By the
time that the tournament comes to an end, tens of thou-
sands of different models have been tested across a wide
range of choices. Overall, how would these teams and
their models have performed?
Our goal in this section is to answer this question by
plausibly reconstructing the imagined tournament using
the framework developed in Section IV above. We ex-
haustively simulate models over a wide range of reason-
able choices, and then analyze the performance of these
models in aggregate. In this analysis, we focus on two
key model parameters - rank thresholding, i.e., “crowd
size,” and experience thresholding. In addition, we de-
velop intuition and provide context through a series of
representative models drawn from the model space.
A. Model Test Space
To construct our model test space, we select a range
of model configurations and hyperparameters. Below, we
describe the configurations and parameters of the model
space, beginning with the crowd subset rules and param-
eters tested.
1. Experience Threshold: We evaluate crowd mod-
els with and without experience thresholding as de-
fined in Section IV B above. For models with ex-
perience thresholding, we evaluate thresholds from
1 to 99, inclusive, by steps of 1. In figures and ta-
bles below, we represent models without experience
thresholding as having a threshold of 0.
2. Performance Threshold: We evaluate crowd
models with and without performance thresholding
as defined in Section IV B above. For models with
performance thresholding, we evaluate accuracy-
based thresholds with two cutoffs - 62%, repre-
senting the “always guess reverse” null model’s his-
torical accuracy rate, and 70%, representing the
approximate accuracy of the purely data-driven
models.43
3. Rank Threshold: We evaluate crowd models with
and without rank thresholding as defined in Section
IV B above. For models with rank thresholding, we
evaluate two types of rank thresholds: one based
on experience and one based on accuracy. For both
rank threshold types, we evaluate rank threshold
ranges from 1 to 99, inclusive, by steps of 1.
4. Statistical Threshold: We evaluate crowd mod-
els with and without statistical thresholding as de-
fined in Section IV B above. For models with sta-
tistical thresholding, we evaluate using a one-sided
binomial test with p-value thresholds. For each
participant in each case, we perform the test us-
ing all of their prior case predictions to determine
whether the Bernoulli probability of their accuracy
distribution exceeds the null model. If the p-value
of this test is strictly less than our threshold, then
the participant is included in our crowd subset. We
test three p-value thresholds - 0.01, 0.05, as com-
mon modern statistical thresholds, and 0.5, as a
decision-theoretic threshold.
Next, we describe the configurations and parame-
ters used for our linear crowd models M j(d). In
this paper, no “machine learning” crowd models as
described in Section IV D are presented, although
some literature refers to exponential weighting as
such.
5. Linear Crowd Models: We evaluate linear crowd
models with three types of weights: equal weight,
linear weight, and exponential weight. For linear
and exponential weight models, we test using two
factors to determine rank: experience and accuracy.
For exponential weight models, we test with three
values of α: 1.0, 0.5, and 0.1.
7In total, this combination of crowd subset and weight-
ing rules and parameters produces a model space with
277,201 models. This number corresponds to 1 + 99 ·
100 · 28, where the first term corresponds to the sim-
plest crowdsourcing model with no subset or weighting
rules, and the second term corresponds to 28 models -
each combination of threshold or weighting rules - for
each combination of 99 rank and 100 experience thresh-
olds. We exhaustively sample this space using empirical
prediction data from FantasySCOTUS as described in
Section II above. While we highlight a set of general
and specific results, we direct the interested reader to
this publication’s website, where source code, data, and
results will be available.
B. Results
For each of our 277,201 model configurations, we
record information about the model’s performance for
each Justice in each case, including the number of par-
ticipants and model score for the crowd. Using this infor-
mation, we can assess the performance of these models in
both nuanced or aggregate ways. Doing so allows us to
address questions like whether crowds better predict con-
servative or liberal Justices or whether crowds perform
better at the beginning or end of each term.
1. Baseline
Within the context of this research, we focus on the ag-
gregate performance of the crowd across all cases. How-
ever, performance is not just a simple calculation of ac-
curacy; instead, performance assessment should instead
capture a model’s strengths and weaknesses relative to
existing prediction methods. To accomplish this goal,
we evaluate both accuracy and F1 scores relative to a
fair “baseline” or “null” model. In prior related work,
we highlight some commonly held wisdom regarding the
appropriate null model in this context:
[...] few legal experts would rely on an un-
weighted coin as a null model against which to
compare their predictions. Instead, informed
by recent years, common wisdom among the
legal community is that the baseline betting
strategy should be to always guess Reverse.
This strategy is supported by the recent his-
tory of the Court over the last 35 terms: 57%
of Justice votes and 63% of case outcomes
have been Reverse.43
Following this commonly-held understanding, we use
the “always guess reverse” null model in this paper as a
baseline to consider both the Justice-level and case-level
outcomes. Within our sample, the proportions are 64.6%
and 61.5% reverse for case and Justice outcomes, respec-
tively. From a legal perspective, the Supreme Court usu-
ally “takes a case” to correct an error below, not to affirm
it.
2. Example Model Performance
It is difficult to understand a forest without first exam-
ining a tree or two. Before presenting the aggregate re-
sults of hundreds of thousands of models, we first present
four example models so that the reader can develop more
understanding about the behavior of individual models.
Below, we describe four models of increasing complexity
selected from the model space above.
1. Simple majority rule: For a given docket d
and a set of participants S(d), let M j(d) be
the simple majority rule voting model. In other
words, M j(d) = 1|S(d)|
∑
i∈S(d) c
j
i (d), i.e., an equal-
weighting of all participant predictions.
2. “Follow the Leader(s)” without experience
thresholding: For a given docket d and a set of
participants S(d), let M j(d) be the “Follow the
Leader” (FTL) model without experience thresh-
olding. In other words, let the crowd subset S∗
be defined as {i : s(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S(d)},
where s(i, I(d)) = IRP (i,I(d))=1, and let M j(d) be
an equal weighting or simple majority over this
crowd subset. In cases where there are ties in accu-
racy, which do occur, then there are multiple Lead-
ers.
3. “Follow the Leader(s)” with experience
thresholding: For a given docket d and a set
of participants S(d), let M j(d) be a “Follow the
Leader” (FTL) model with an experience thresh-
olding requiring at least five cases. In other words,
let the crowd subset S∗(d) be defined sequen-
tially through two filters: first, S∗(d) is calcu-
lated as {i : s1(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S(d)}, where
s1(i, I(d)) = IXP(i,I(d))≥5; second, S∗(d) is up-
dated as {i : s2(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S∗(d)}, where
s2(i, I(d)) = IRP (i,I(d))=1. Finally, let M j(d) be an
equal weighting or simple majority over this crowd
subset. In cases where there are ties in accuracy,
which do occur, then there are multiple Leaders.
4. Maximum accuracy model: Finally, to demon-
strate the performance “ceiling” of 80.8%, we
present the model with the maximum accuracy
in our sample. This model is defined for a
given docket d and a set of participants S(d)
is defined sequentially through two crowd sub-
set filters. First, S∗(d) is calculated as {i :
s1(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S(d)}, where s1(i, I(d)) =
IXP(i,I(d))≥5. Second, S∗(d) is updated as {i :
s2(i, I(T (d)) = 1 ∀i ∈ S∗(d)}, where s2(i, I(d)) =
8IRP (i,I(d))≤22. We then apply exponential weight-
ing with an α of 0.1, i.e., we let M j(d) be
1∑
i∈S∗(d) exp(−0.1·RP (i))
∑
i∈S∗(d) exp(−0.1 · RP (i)) ·
cji (d).
Table II displays both the case-level accuracy and F1
score for each of the Example Models listed above, as
well as the always guess reverse null model for purposes
of baseline comparison. Table II demonstrates that all of
these crowdsourcing models produce more accurate re-
sults than the null model.
Description Accuracy F1
Baseline - Always guess reverse 64.6 78.4
1 - Simple majority rule 66.4 69.2
2 - FTL without experience thresholding 65.7 71.2
3 - FTL with experience thresholding 72.8 78.7
4 - Maximum accuracy 80.8 85.2
TABLE II. Case-level performance metrics for example and
baseline models
Figure 1 displays the time series of case-level cumu-
lative accuracy for each of the illustrative model config-
urations. The null model is also included for purposes
of comparison. After some initial volatility, the perfor-
mance is very consistent over the six-year period of study.
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FIG. 1. Cumulative case-level accuracy of example and base-
line models
In addition to the case-level performance, we also dis-
play overall Justice-level results, which are slightly lower
from an accuracy standpoint but otherwise qualitatively
similar. Table III displays the aggregate performance of
our example model at the Justice level for the same set
of model configurations as Table II.
Figure 2 displays the time series of Justice-level cumu-
lative accuracy for each of the example model configu-
Description Accuracy F1
Baseline - Always guess reverse 61.5 76.2
1 - Simple majority rule 65.5 71.2
2 - FTL without experience thresholding 63.8 70.5
3 - FTL with experience thresholding 72.2 78.7
4 - Maximum accuracy 77.1 83.1
TABLE III. Justice-level performance metrics for example
and baseline models
rations. As before, the null model is also included as a
baseline for purposes of comparison.
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FIG. 2. Cumulative Justice-level accuracy of example and
baseline models
3. Model Space Performance
In this paper, our goal is not just to demonstrate that
a well-selected model such as the four identified above
can outperform the null model; rather, our goal is to
demonstrate that crowdsourcing, across a wide range of
conditions and choices, can outperform other commonly
used prediction methods. To do so, we present in this sec-
tion both the aggregate accuracy and overall robustness
of our model space.
First, we evaluate a number of population-level calcu-
lations about our model space. Across all models, the
mean and median Justice-level model accuracy exceeds
the null model by 12.0%. Similarly, the mean and me-
dian Case-level model accuracy exceeds the null model
by 9.5% and 9.6%, respectively. All 277,201 (100%) of
models exceed the null model for Justice-level prediction;
however, 8 of 277,201 models fail to exceed the null for
Case-level predictions. These 8 models are all charac-
terized by their rank threshold value of 2 and majority-
rule vote model, resulting in an inability to break ties in
9many cases. More impressively, 86.9% of models exceed
the Justice-level null model accuracy by at least 10%,
and 41.4% of models exceed the Case-level null model
accuracy by at least 10%.
Second, as noted earlier, we project the model space
onto two key dimensions - rank threshold and experience
threshold. These two dimensions are the most commonly
used crowd construction parameters. Rank thresholding
is generally used to control the crowd size, allowing mod-
elers to capture either “Follow the Leader” behavior with
a rank threshold of 1 or the “wisdom of the crowd” as
the rank threshold exceeds the crowd size. Experience
thresholding is generally used to control the quality of
data about participants and ensure engagement; by set-
ting higher experience thresholds, models have more data
to use to make decisions about participants.
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FIG. 3. Case-level accuracy spread by rank and experience
threshold
In our experiment, we evaluate values of rank thresh-
olds from 1 to 99 and values of experience thresholds
from 0 to 99. In Figures 3 and 4, we present accuracy
metrics across a 99×100 grid, where each cell within the
contour plot is an average across 28 models varying all
other model construction configurations and parameters.
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that crowdsourcing in this
context is both accurate and robust.
While there is variance across the space, especially vis-
ible in the “corners” of the parameter space, the vast ma-
jority of the contour plots are green, and all 9900 cells
have positive averages. Furthermore, these two figures
demonstrate vertical even-odd “waves,” hinting at the
effect of tie-breaking on even-sized crowds for simpler
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FIG. 4. Justice-level accuracy spread by rank and experience
threshold
model types. Overall, however, both Justice and Case-
level parameter spaces are characterized by large, stable
performance “plateaus” near the origin. These plateaus
are easy to guess; for example, beginning with a crowd
size of 10 participants and an experience threshold of 10
cases immediately lands a modeler in the plateau. Other
than the Follow-the-Leader models at the origin, as one
moves away from this plateau, performance gradually de-
clines but remains positive relative to the baseline. Qual-
itatively similar results are found for F1 scores, which can
be examined on this paper’s GitHub repository.
Justice Accuracy (%) Baseline (%) Sample Size
Alito 75.0 61.3 445
Breyer 72.3 61.5 449
Ginsburg 74.5 61.5 449
Gorsuch 77.4 57.1 14
Kagan 74.7 61.9 443
Kennedy 72.2 63.7 449
Roberts 73.3 64.5 448
Scalia 74.0 59.8 328
Sotomayor 72.6 61.6 445
Thomas 73.0 57.5 449
TABLE IV. Average Accuracy by Justice across all models
In order to provide additional evidence for the robust-
ness of crowdsourcing, we also examine how crowdsourc-
ing performs for each Justice on the Court. In Figure
5, we present a violin plot for the model accuracy across
the entire model space for each Justice excluding Gor-
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FIG. 5. Distribution of model accuracy for individual Justices
such, who is omitted from the figure due to his very small
sample size. First, we observe a relatively small range of
central tendency between Justices; the median model ac-
curacy for all Justices is between 71% and 76%. Second,
we observe that while central tendency is relatively tight,
the tails and skewness of these Justice-level distributions
vary more so. For example, Breyer, Scalia, and Gins-
burg all exhibit large negative and positive tails relative
to other Justices. Third, despite the wide tails for some
Justices, we find that the performance for most models
for most Justices is well above baseline rates. Even the
minimum accuracy model is greater than the baseline for
all Justices other than Breyer, Kennedy, and Roberts,
and the 1st percentile of model accuracies is greater than
the baseline rate for all Justices. Table IV provides the
average accuracy across all 277,201 models, the baseline
“always guess reverse” rate, and the sample size for each
Justice, including Gorsuch. These Justice-level findings
provide additional support for the accuracy and robust-
ness of crowdsourcing in this context.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide strong support for the claim
that crowdsourcing can accurately and robustly pre-
dict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. More importantly, unlike most extant litera-
ture on crowdsourcing, we do so through the applica-
tion of empirical model thinking. This approach allows
us to confidently demonstrate that, across a wide range
of choices regarding crowdsourcing model configurations
and parameters, crowdsourcing outperforms both the
commonly accepted “always guess reverse” model and
the best-studied algorithmic models.
In the process of supporting these results, we also pro-
duce two additional contributions - an open crowdsourc-
ing dataset and a comprehensive, formal framework for
crowdsourcing model construction. To our knowledge,
this dataset represents one of the largest available sources
of recurring human prediction to date, and we encourage
other researchers to build on this resource in future re-
search. Furthermore, we believe our model construction
framework can help researchers design and communicate
more effectively across a range of theoretical and applied
crowdsourcing problems.
In future work, we will examine the application of more
sophisticated “machine learning” models, as discussed in
Section IV above, as well as how information such as sub-
ject matter, plaintiff, defendant, or Justice can be used
to improve the performance of Supreme Court predic-
tion models. Lastly, we intend to apply our empirical
model thinking to other crowdsourcing contexts, such as
the prediction of elections or legislative outcomes.
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